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Optometrists' Tort Liability
Gerald F. Sweeney*
T H, QUESTION "Do you need glasses?" should be answered in
the affirmative by many people, nowadays. Most of us, at
some time, find it necessary to visit one of the many establish-
ments for the correction of defective vision. When the time does
arrive, we are confident that our chosen "professional" will fill
our needs adequately, yet, mistakes and oversights occur. What
happens when a serious injury occurs as a result of this possi-
bility? This article attempts to answer that question briefly.
A recent case, Evers v. Buxbaum,i had as the main issue
this exact point. The plaintiff had gone to an unlicensed optome-
trist, who, in turn, sent him to a licensed optometrist for an eye
examination. A possible pathology requiring medical care was
discovered by the second optometrist. He informed the first op-
tometrist of this fact. Neither told the plaintiff of his dangerous
condition. The first optometrist sold him glasses and when the
plaintiff tried them on he failed to note any improvement; but
"Buxbaum said for me to wear the glasses and get used to them
and that my eyes would adjust to them." The plaintiff's eyesight
became worse. Eventually blindness developed in one eye. He
sued both men for failure to discover and/or timely advise him
of the presence of a tumor. There was a summary judgment for
the defendants in the lower court. The plaintiff appealed, and
the appellate court reversed and remanded, saying:
The question is whether or not in the execution of the
duty of appellees owed to Evers, under all circumstances,
they reasonably were required to impart to him the exist-
ence of a recognized need that he consult a doctor who might
make a correct diagnosis. We cannot know whether or not
if appellant had been referred to an opthalmologist on April
28, 1956, the tumor was discoverable or if so whether or not
surgery at that early date could have led to the saving of the
sight of this right eye. Whether or not Evers was actually
induced by fraudulent misrepresentations to purchase the
glasses, however tenuous the claim on the record here, is a
matter of proof. Evidence as to all such issues (including
* B.BA., Baldwin-Wallace College; third-year student at Cleveland-Mar-
shall Law School.
1 Evers v. Buxbaum, 253 F. 2d 356 (D. C. Cir. 1957).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1959
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
causation) must be developed in a trial whereupon the ap-
pellant may prove he is entitled to go to the jury.2
The language of the court strongly indicates that an optometrist's
failure to warn his customer of an eye pathology may be action-
able.
It should be noted that in eye injury malpractice cases it is
difficult to distinguish between the results of the alleged mal-
practice and ordinary and unavoidable results of the treatment of
the original injuries. Due to the delicacy of the eye structure,
even a slight injury may produce very serious results. Surgery
seldom is undertaken except in cases where the loss of vision is
threatened as an effect of the diseased condition.8
For intelligent insight into this matter, it is necessary to
make a brief survey covering the field. The first step is to define
optometry and to distinguish an optometrist from an oculist and
an ophthalmologist.
Optometry is the employment of any means, other than the
use of drugs, for the measurement of the power or range of
human vision or the determination of the accommodative and
refractive states of the human eye or the scope of its functions in
general or the adaptation of lenses or frames for the aid thereof.4
An optometrist examines eyes for refractive error, recog-
nizes, but does not treat diseases of the eye, and fills prescriptions
for eye glasses.5
An oculist is a physician who specializes in the diagnosis and
treatment of diseases of the eye. He also examines eyes for the
purpose of determining whether or not glasses are needed, and
prescribes lenses when necessary for the correction of vision.6
An ophthalmologist, the technically correct name of an
oculist, is a duly licensed physician who specializes in the care of
the eyes. He is one who is skilled in the physiology, anatomy and
diseases of the eye.7
The basic distinction between the optometrist and the oculist,
or the ophthalmologist, lies in the fact that the calling of either
of the latter two has relation to the practice of medicine, whereas
2 Id. at p. 361.
8 13 A. L. R. 2d 11, 94 (1950).
4 41 Am. Jur. 134, Phy. & S. Sec. 2, n. 6 (1942).
5 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955).
6 70 C. J. S. 809, Phy. & S., Sec. 1 (1951).
7 State v. Yegge, 19 S. D. 234, 103 N. W. 17 (1905).
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the calling of the former has relation to the measurement of the
powers of vision and the adaptation of lenses for the aid thereof. s
The second step in the survey is to illustrate that optometry
and related fields have been the subject of regulation by govern-
mental bodies for a number of years. The basis for this regulation
is that "the preservation and protection of the public health is
one of the duties devolving on the state in the exercise of its
inherent police power." 9 Thus, to illustrate, the same power and
the same justification for state regulation of physicians extends to
the regulation of optometrists or other persons treating defective
vision without the use of drugs or surgery. 10
In recent years many states have adopted statutes especially
regulating the practice of optometry, which provide for the grant-
ing of special or limited licenses to persons practicing that system
for the correction of vision without the use of drugs." Such
statutes usually, if not always, define the practice of optometry,
and either in express terms or by necessary implication restrict a
licensee in optometry to the practice of that branch of the healing
art as it is defined and limited in the statute.12 Whether or not
the practice of optometry and other drugless methods of treating
the eyes or correcting vision, solely or chiefly by mechanical
means and medicine, constitutes the practice of medicine in any
given case depends on the acts and conduct of the practitioner
and the terms of the particular statute involved. 13 It depends,
too, on the terms of the statutory definition of the practice of
medicine. Thus, in the absence of a statute specifically exempting
the practice of optometry, such practice has been held to be
within the meaning of a statute defining the practice of medicine
in very broad and comprehensive terms, 14 but not where
optometry is the subject of a separate regulatory statute which
specifically provides it shall not be construed as the practice of
medicine or surgery.15 An optometrist's examination of the eyes
for the purpose of determining whether such person's disorders
of the eyes are due to a diseased condition or to some defect of
8 Silver v. Lansburgh, 111 F. 2d 518 (D. C. Cir. 1940).
9 41 Am. Jur. 138, n. 1 (1942).
10 Ibid., 139, n. 8.
11 McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U. S. 344 (1917).
12 Baker v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. 607, 240 S. W. 924 (1921), 22 A. L. R. 1173
(1923).
'3 41 Am. Jur. p. 158 (1942).
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
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vision which can be corrected by lenses is regarded by some
courts as a diagnosis, and hence, as the practice of medicine,16
while in other jurisdictions the contrary conclusion has been
reached.17 It has been held that one advertising as an "eye
expert" and offering to treat named disorders, which frequently
result from defective vision, does not thereby practice medicine
where he does no more than examine eyes and fit spectacles to
persons of defective vision. But where the examination of the
eyes and the fitting of glasses has been accompanied by the pre-
scribing of drugs, the courts have usually held the persons doing
such acts to be engaged in practicing medicine within the mean-
ing of the statute.'8
A state may, in the exercise of its police power, regulate
the practice of optometry and confine to registered optometrists
who have passed the examination prescribed by statute the right
to employ means other than drugs to measure the range of
human vision and the accommodative and refractive states of the
human eye. 19 A constitutional prohibition of preference to any
school of medicine does not prevent the legislature from de-
fining the practice of medicine or from excluding from such
definition the practice of optometry so as to distinguish be-
tween optometry in its strict, technical sense and acts by op-
tometrists which only a licensed physician may legally per-
form.20 The question has frequently arisen whether a corpora-
tion or unlicensed persons may practice optometry through duly
licensed optometrists. The answer is usually to be found in the
special facts and circumstances of the particular case, 21 except
where the statute regulating optometry expressly limits the
practice thereof to duly licensed individuals or persons.2 2 Under
another statute which treats optometry merely as a mechanical
art, it has been held that a corporation may engage therein,
through licensed optometrists, on the ground that such practice
involves no such personal relationship as exists between physician
and patient.23 To illustrate specifically, it has been held that
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 McNaughton v. Johnson, supra n. 11.
20 Baker v. State, supra n. 12.
21 Baker v. State, supra n. 12; 102 A. L. R. 343 (1936).
22 State ex rel. Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan. 881, 51 P. 2d 995
(1935).
23 Silver v. Landsburg, supra, n. 9.
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opticians who merely fill prescriptions of licensed optometrists
who occupy adjacent office rooms under a reciprocal arrange-
ment by which the opticians provide the offices and necessary
equipment, but which includes no splitting of fees and no em-
ployer-employee arrangement, are not engaged in the unlicensed
practice of optometry.24 A regulation requiring optometrists to
be licensed and providing that nothing therein contained shall
prohibit the operation in a department store of an optical de-
partment under supervision of a duly licensed optometrist does
not prohibit such a store from merely selling optical goods with-
out employing a licensed optometrist.25 A state may, however,
provide by statute that eyeglasses, spectacles and lenses cannot
be sold unless a duly licensed physician or a duly qualified
optometrist is in charge of and in personal attendance at the
place where such articles are sold. 26 An ophthalmologist who
treats eye complaints and holds himself out to the public as a
doctor is usually regarded as practicing medicine.27
Some specific examples of this regulation can be found in
Ohio, California, and New York.
Ohio's Revised Code covers the subject of optometry in Sec-
tions 4725.01 to 4725.99. These sections deal with the necessity of
acquiring a license before a person can hold himself out as a
practitioner of optometry (§ 4725.02). They also regulate the ex-
amination given to these practitioners (§ 4725.08), as well as
setting forth various acts which are prohibited in the practice of
optometry (§ 4725.09).
The penal statute is § 4725.99. It states:
Whoever violates section 4725.02 of the Revised Code shall
be fined not more than five hundred dollars for the first of-
fense; for each subsequent offense such person shall be fined
not less than five hundred dollars, nor more than one
thousand dollars, or imprisoned not less than six months
nor more than one year.
California's statutes, dealing with optometry, are Division
2, Chapter 7, Articles 1-7. They are similar to the Ohio statutes
covering the same subject. However, the punishment for a vio-
lation of any of the provisions in Article 6 is broader.
24 State ex rel. Bierring v. Ritzhol, 226 Ia. 70, 283 N. W. 268 (1939).
25 Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 179 A. 195 (1935), 98 A. L. R.
897 (1935).
26 Roschen v. Ward, 273 N. Y. 75, 279 U. S. 337 (1928).
27 State v. Wilhite, 132 Ia. 226, 109 N. W. 730, 22 A. L. R. 1177 (1906).
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Section 3120 of Article 6 provides that:
Any person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter
is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not
less than ten days nor more than one year, or by a fine
of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one
thousand five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
New York's regulation of optometrists is covered under Edu-
cation Law, Sections 7101-7111. They set forth the definition of
an optometrist in Section 7101, and deal with the qualifications
for practice; establish a state board of examiners; require the
giving of examinations, and issuing licenses and certificates, and
finally provide a penalty for the violation of these statutes. 28
One of the leading New York cases exemplifying this regu-
lation of optometry is Findlay Strauss, Inc. v. University of State
of New York.29
The third step attempts to show how a legal standard of care
is arrived at in determining whether or not a negligent act has
been performed. The whole theory of negligence presupposes
some uniform standard of behavior. Yet, the infinite variety of
situations which may arise makes it impossible to fix definite
rules in advance for all conceivable human conduct. 30
The courts have dealt with this difficult problem by creating
a fictitious person, the "reasonable man of ordinary prudence."
The characteristics of this imaginary person include:
(a) The physical attributes of the actor himself
(b) Normal intelligence and mental capacity
(c) Normal perception and memory, and a minimum of ex-
perience and information, common to all the community
(d) Such superior skill and knowledge as the actor has, or
holds himself out as having, when he undertakes to
act.31
28 N. Y. Statutes, 3 C. L. S. 579.
29 270 App. Div. 1060, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 892 (1946). The statutory power of
regents to supervise the practice of optometry includes making rules per-
taining to professional conduct. The Board of Regents had jurisdiction to
adopt rules governing the practice of optometry relating to price advertising
and unprofessional conduct which would prevent employers of optometrists
from making sales of spectacles dependent on an examination by employed
optometrists at prices which include such examination to be made without
cost to purchaser.
30 Prosser, Torts 131 (2d ed. 1955).
31 Id., p. 124.
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The jury is instructed to pose the question, "What would a
reasonable man do under the same or similar circumstances?"
It is then for the jury to decide whether the act of the person in
the disputed case compares with the act, or behavior, of the
imaginary reasonable man. If it does, then he is not guilty of
negligence. If it does not, then he is guilty of a negligent act.
The characteristic that seems most important in our study
of optometrists' tort liability is (d). Professional men in gen-
eral, and those who undertake any work calling for special skill,
are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they
do, but also to possess a degree of special knowledge and ability
ordinarily found in the profession. Most of the decided cases have
dealt with physicians and surgeons, but the same is undoubtedly
true of many other "professions." A case in point is Kahn v.
Shaw.3 2
In that case the plaintiff, a minor of tender years, was suing
an optometrist for $5,000 damages on account of the alleged neg-
ligence of defendant, in treating the plaintiff's eyes. Plaintiff was
examined by defendant and received a prescription for corrective
glasses. After wearing the glasses for several weeks, plaintiff
returned to the optometrist and complained of headaches and
nausea. The plaintiff was assured by the defendant that this con-
dition would subside. He continued wearing the glasses and the
promised results did not materialize. Plaintiff then went to an
oculist for an examination. The oculist testified the prescription
given to the plaintiff by the defendant differed greatly-from the
one he finally gave the plaintiff. He also testified that the de-
fendant did not dilate the eyes of the plaintiff before the initial
examination, and that this was very necessary when examining
minors. The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant ap-
pealed. The higher court agreed that the evidence supported
the verdict. In reference to paragraph one of the syllabus the
court says:
A skillful and careful diagnosis of the trouble from which
the patient is suffering is one of the fundamental duties of
a physician, and if he fails in that regard as well as in the
application of proper treatment and damages result there-
from, the physician must answer.33
32 65 Ga. 563, 16 S. E. 2d 99 (1941).
33 Ibid., p. 102, 16 S. E. 2d 99 (1941).
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Furthermore, malpractice may consist in a lack of skill or
care in diagnosis, as well as in treatment.34 Without deciding
whether the practice of optometry is a learned profession, the
defendant should certainly exercise skill and care in the exami-
nation of a patient's eyes, and in prescribing and fitting of glasses,
and whether or not the facts of this case showed negligence on
the part of the defendant in his examination and treatment of
the plaintiff, was for the jury. In determining what constitutes
ordinary care and what constitutes negligence the jury would
not be confined to the testimony of an optometrist as to what
constitutes ordinary care and skill in the examination and treat-
ment of a person's eyes, including the fitting of glasses.3 5
Jensen v. Findley3" is another case in which the degree of
care was defined:
One who holds himself out as a specialist in the treatment of
a certain organ, injury or disease, is bound to bring to the
aid of one so employing him, that degree of skill and knowl-
edge which is ordinarily possessed by those who devote
special study and attention to that particular organ, injury,
or disease, its diagnosis, and its treatment, in the same gen-
eral locality having regard to the state of scientific knowl-
edge at the time.3 7
Not only is there a standard of conduct required of op-
tometrists in the examining of eyes but, there is the duty to in-
form the customer of the true results of the examination. The
Court of Appeals in Evers v. Buxbaum had this to say:
Buxbaum had undertaken an affirmative line of conduct, and
throughout he was under an affirmative duty to take what-
ever precautions were reasonably required to protect Evers
from negligence stemming from that conduct. The simple
subsisting fact is that when he was under a duty to speak
he chose not to do so. 3
8
The fourth, and final step of this survey is a review of the
leading cases covering the general field of optometry and
ophthalmology.
The first case, D. S. Kresge Company v. Ottinger, Attorney
General,39 dealt with a New York statute prohibiting the sale of
34 Kuechler v. Volgmann, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N. W. 1015 (1923).
35 Kahn v. Shaw, supra, n. 33. See also 21 R. C. L. 388 (1918).
36 17 Cal. App. 2d 536, 62 P. 2d 430 (1937).
37 Id., 62 P. 2d at 430.
38 Evers v. Buxbaum, supra n. 1 at p. 359.
39 29 F. 2d 762 (1928), affd. 279 U. S. 337 (1929).
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eyeglasses in any store, unless a duly licensed physician, or
optometrist was in charge of and in personal attendance. The
plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of this statute. Kresge
Company alleged that it had fifty stores in New York and that
it would have been impossible to continue selling eye glasses if
they were required to hire an optometrist, or a physician for each
store. The court held the statute not to be void and denied the
injunction.
In Silver v. Lansburgh & Brothers,40 the issue was, whether
a corporation in the District of Columbia could employ a licensed
practitioner of optometry to perform optometrical services for
those to whom the corporation offered such services. The plain-
tiff based his claim upon the ground that optometry was a
learned profession, and as such, prohibited the practitioner from
any affiliation or connection with a corporation. The court found
that optometry is a mechanical art which requires skill, but is
not a learned profession and therefore ruled in favor of the
defendants.
In Williamson v. Lee Optical Company,41 an Oklahoma
statute dealing with the regulation of visual care was upheld.
The U. S. Supreme Court ruled that no due process violation
resulted from the statute's provisions which (1) prohibited an
optician from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription
from an ophthalmologist or optometrist; (2) prohibited the ad-
vertisement of spectacles, eye glasses, lenses or prisms, or eye-
glass frames, mountings, or other optical appliances; and (3)
barred operators of retail stores from furnishing space therein to
any person purporting to do eye examination or visual care. It
was held, further, that no invidious discrimination, violative of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in-
hered in the statute's exemption from regulation of sellers or
ready-to-wear glasses.42
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Stern v. Lanng,43 was
concerned with the alleged malpractice of an oculist. The action
was for the alleged unskillful and negligent manner in which the
defendant, as a physician, performed the duty he had assumed.
The rule is well settled that the oculist who treats a patient must
exercise in that regard the care and skill usually exercised by
40 Supra n. 8.
41 Supra n. 5.
42 Supra n. 5. See also "Regulation of Visual Care," 99 L. Ed. 574 (1955).
43 106 La. 738, 31 So. 303 (1901).
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an oculist in good standing. He may be rendered liable for his
gross mistakes. But it was not shown by a preponderance of
testimony that defendant, through want of skill or negligence,
committed a mistake for which he can be held pecuniarly liable.
Experts testified that he followed the established practice, and
it was not shown that he committed a gross error, the proximate
cause of the injury of which plaintiff complains.
In the case of Hampton v. Brackin's Jewelry and Optical
Co.,4 4 the plaintiff sued the defendant, under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, for the alleged negligence of its servant, a
licensed optometrist. The court found there was a master-servant
relationship, and then went on to answer the plaintiff's complaint.
The complaint consisted of four counts. Count 3 proceeded upon
the theory that the plaintiff was suffering from a disease of the
eye, which could not be remedied by the application of glasses,
or mechanical treatment, but which could have been remedied or
cured by medical treatment, but that nevertheless the defendant's
optometrist, after an examination of plaintiff's eyes, fitted plain-
tiff with glasses, and represented to her that the glasses would
cure the trouble. This count further alleged that by defendant's
action and representation the plaintiff was prevented from secur-
ing treatment by a doctor or specialist, and that by reason of the
delay in securing medical treatment plaintiff lost the sight of
one of her eyes, which could have been saved by a specialist and
deterioration of the sight of the other eye could have been
stopped.
The court in considering this count first referred to the
International Encyclopaedia. Under the stimulus of legislation,
optometry as a science has rapidly developed, and improved
instruments for the examination of the eye, as well as many
advances in the adaption of lenses to correct visual errors have
been introduced. Students are now thoroughly grounded in the
science of optics as a preliminary to the examination of the
eye. While no attempt is made to teach diagnosis and treatment
of eye diseases, and while dilation of the pupil with drugs is for-
bidden by law, the student is taught to distinguish between mere
refractive errors and pathological conditions of the ocular tissue.
All the processes connected with the manufacture of lenses are
also studied.45
44 237 Ala. 212, 186 So. 173 (1939).
45 New International Encyclopedia, Vol. 17, p. 495 (2d ed. 1954).
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The Court continues: "Clearly then the duty resting upon
the optometrist was to make an examination of the plaintiff's eyes
for the purpose of ascertaining any departure from normal vision.
If, however, in the performance of those duties it would be ap-
parent to a skillful optometrist that there existed in the eye under
examination a disease or malformation, we would not say that it
would not be his duty to so advise his patient so that proper
medical or surgical treatment might be had." 46 On the undis-
puted evidence in this case it was apparent that the disease of
plaintiff's eyes was not such as that it should have been detected
by a skillful optometrist in the performance of the duties per-
taining to his profession, and that he did not discover such a
condition to exist. And, therefore, he did not breach a possible
duty in that connection.
The case of Colin v. Smith 4 7 illustrates that a tort action
does not act as a bar to a contract action. In the first action,
plaintiff alleged defendant used insufficient anesthesia as a result
of which her eye was injured during a spasm. In the second
action plaintiff sued for breach of contract whereby she alleged
that she hired defendant as a specialist in the field of eye surgery
to remove a cataract; that he failed to remove the cataract; that
he injured her eye during the operation and as a result she lost
light perception and vision, and had a droopy lid. The court held
that plaintiff could maintain both actions, that the first was not a
bar to the second since different facts would have to be proved
in each action, and the recovery had in each would compensate
for different damages.
The statute of limitations, as a general rule in most jurisdic-
tions, begins to run from the date of the wrongful act or omission
(except in the case of fraudulent concealment) and not from the
date of the damage. 48 However, the running of the statute of
limitations is not suspended by the mere fact that treatment con-
tinues after the original act. But where the injurious con-
sequences arise from a course of treatment, the statute does not
commence to run until the course of treatment is terminated.
The malpractice is regarded as a continuing wrong and the fact
46 Hampton v. Brackin's Jewelry, supra n. 44, at 179.
47 94 N. Y. S. 2d 98 (1948), aff'd. 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 794 (1949).
48 Friedman, "Ophthalmology and the Law," 85 Med. Times 557 (1957).
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that a substantial portion of the injury resulted before completion
of the treatment is immaterial.49
This point is brought out in the case of Shives v. Chamber-
lain 50 where the loss of vision in the right eye occurred more
than two years before institution of legal action, but treatment
to the other eye continued within the two-year limit. The court
held that the plaintiff could recover for loss of vision of the right
eye as well as impairment of vision of the left. The physician's
continued treatment constituted a continuing wrong causing the
statute of limitations to start running when treatment ceased.
The concluding three cases will serve as illustrations that the
amount of damages awarded for eye injuries varies in each case.
In California, a plaintiff was awarded a $15,000 judgment for the
loss of the right eye after a nasal operation for asthma.5 1 In
Dean v. Dyer,52 $8,500 was awarded when a physician errone-
ously and negligently inserted a caustic solution in plaintiff's eye,
causing loss of vision in that eye, despite the fact that vision
would have been imperfect in any event. The case of Shives v.
Chamberlain 5 3 resulted in an $18,000 judgment in favor of plain-
tiff for the loss of sight in one eye and damage of vision in the
other caused by negligent and erroneous diagnosis of glaucoma.
49 Ibid.
50 168 Or. 676, 126 P. 2d 28 (1942).
51 Langford v. Kosterlitz, 107 Cal. 175, 290 P. 2d 80 (1930).
52 64 Cal. 646, 149 P. 2d 288 (1944).
53 Supra n. 50.
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